



HOME OFFICE

BOMBS

Protecting People and Property

A H A N D B O O K F O R M A N A G E R S - F O U R T H E D I T I O N

Preface

This is the fourth edition of the handbook *Bombs – Protecting People and Property* which was first published by the Home Office in 1994. The text has been fully revised: it incorporates the best and most up-to-date advice from experts in Government and the Police Service.

Bombs – Protecting People and Property has been written specifically with managers in mind. The advice which it contains is relevant to all businesses and organisations large or small and to local government.

The handbook is, of necessity, written with a wide audience in mind. It does not – cannot – address the particular circumstances of each reader. More detailed or specific advice and guidance on your business needs can be obtained from local police Crime Prevention Departments. You can make contact with the Crime Prevention Department in your area through your local police station.

Main Messages

- Assess the likelihood of terrorist attack on your organisation and plan your physical security measures accordingly
- Prepare your staff for the possibility of telephoned bomb threats
- Choose the mix of protective measures that best suits your premises and that will deter or detect the terrorist
- Encourage your staff to protect themselves and your customers and visitors through vigilance and good housekeeping
- Test your plans regularly, and evaluate the response
- Plan for
 - evacuation
 - search
 - recovery
- Participate in the counter-terrorist security planning in your community: communities defeat terrorism

More specific advice may be obtained from Police Crime Prevention Departments: the advice is free – please seek it.

Contents

Main Messages

Part 1	Introduction	6
Part 2	The Terrorist Threat	7
Part 3	Why Plan At All?	8
Part 4	Devices – And the Damage They Do	9
Part 5	Telephoned Bomb Threats	10
Part 6	Asset Protection	11
Part 7	Security Planning	13
Part 8	Five Plans for Five Possibilities	15
Part 9	Evacuation	19
Part 10	Search	21
Part 11	The Role of the Police	23
Part 12	Recovery Plans	24
Part 13	Useful Addresses	25
Appendix 1	Telephoned Bomb Threat Aide-Mémoire	26
Appendix 2	Protection against Flying Glass	28



Part 1 Introduction

1 In recent years the world has had to get to grips with terrorist crime. The threat presented in the United Kingdom has been at its greatest in connection with the affairs of Northern Ireland. But other groups have also resorted to terrorist crime to publicise their political objectives. Some of these groups are concerned with domestic issues, others operate on the international stage. Some seek to target particular organisations or individuals, others are more indiscriminate in their targeting.

2 It is important to keep the threat in perspective. Terrorist incidents in Great Britain are far from commonplace but when they occur they attract considerable publicity. For most of us, terrorism will remain something which we hear about on the news.

3 Others, however, will find themselves caught up in some way with a terrorist crime. This might be through receiving a telephone threat that a bomb has been planted; being evacuated from an area in which police suspect the presence of a bomb or, for the unfortunate few, being in the vicinity of a bomb explosion.

4 This handbook is designed to help reduce vulnerability to the threat from terrorism. It has been

written for managers in the private and public sectors. Because it addresses a wide audience the advice is general rather than specific. However, the guidance is sufficiently detailed to allow managers to adapt it to the circumstances of their own organisations.

5 More specific advice may be obtained from Police Crime Prevention Departments. The advice is free – please seek it.

6 The handbook aims to help managers to:

- assess the terrorist threat;
- take precautions against the threat of terrorist attack; and
- respond effectively to terrorist incidents.

7 Terrorists are seeking to get their way by violence; to cause damage to people and property; and to gain publicity for their cause. By adopting the measures suggested in this handbook, managers can prevent this.



The Terrorist Threat Part 2

8 Terrorist crimes, often involving shocking acts of violence, are used by various groups or individuals to promote various causes. Sometimes the criminal may resort to terrorist tactics for the purposes of extortion. They may choose specific targets; for example, persons or organisations associated with their political opponents. But increasingly there have been indiscriminate attacks, perhaps aimed at general disruption to the economic life of a country, which place members of the public at direct risk.

Assessing the Threat

9 It is not possible to produce a definitive statement on how to assess the threat of terrorist attack. But it is quite possible to work out the threats to a particular site or organisation, even though the causes that terrorists espouse may seem remote from everyday life. Here is a simple checklist of issues to take into account:

- What does the news tell us about the current national and international climate, or current terrorist campaigns?
- What can the local police tell you about the chance of a terrorist attack in your neighbourhood?
- Is there something about your building or your staff that would attract a terrorist attack: are you seen as having a special relationship with a high profile individual who is a terrorist target in his or her own right; has your company name been associated with animal experimentation?
- Does your location mean that you may suffer collateral damage from an attack on a high risk neighbour?

Terrorist capability – what they might do, and how – is one of the crucial factors in assessing threat. This booklet will describe terrorist capabilities in broad terms so that you can plan with that in mind.

Assessing the Vulnerability

10 You know already what it is that is important to you and your business survival. You probably have plans to safeguard some, or all, of these things from other threats already. For example, you will have defences against, and plans in anticipation of, fire, and defences against criminals who may want to steal your stock.

11 If you have reason to believe that you are likely to be a terrorist target because of the nature of your business, you should anticipate that terrorists will do research to work out where your greatest vulnerability is. What material about you is in the public domain? What published facts point to installations or services that are vital to the continuance of the business? What might attract attention as a prestige target even though its loss may not mean immediate business collapse?

Giving thought to what matters to you, and what is most vulnerable, will enable you to make realistic plans for deterring terrorist attack and minimising the damage should one occur at or near your premises.



Part 3 Why Plan At All?

12 Terrorist attacks, and attacks by extremist campaigners or malicious hoaxers, are designed to intimidate, disrupt, cause economic damage and – in some circumstances – cause injury or loss of life. There are good business reasons for planning to avoid all of these possibilities – or at least to minimise their consequences.

13 But there are also obligations on everyone (employer and employee alike) to play their part in protecting themselves and others. In a counter-terrorist context the police and other agencies may offer advice but the responsibility to seek advice and act upon it lies with the owner or occupier of the premises.

Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1992

14 These regulations provide that:

- All employers owe their staff and visitors a duty of care: the responsibility for safety on their premises rests with employers, not the police.
- Appropriate procedures must be in place in the event of serious, imminent danger.
- There should be persons competent to implement the procedures. (A competent person is one who has sufficient training and experience or knowledge to do what is required of him or her).
- Employees must be informed of the hazards, and the steps to be taken.

- In the case of serious, imminent danger, work must be stopped immediately and people must be moved to a place of safety.
- Access must be restricted, and resumption of normal work prevented, while the serious and imminent danger persists.

In the event of an incident, plans are disclosable and may be the subject of scrutiny in any subsequent enquiries or court proceedings.

What Should be Done?

15 Action should be on the following lines:

- Think about the threats you may face.
- Take the best available advice on the things you can do to reduce the chances that a bomb will cause injury to your staff or visitors.
- Make a contingency plan, ensure that all staff are familiar with it – and practise it.

The material in this booklet will help you to take all these steps, and give you some pointers towards simple measures that can be taken that will considerably reduce vulnerability to explosive devices of all types. Further advice is available through your local police Crime Prevention Department.



Devices – And the Damage They Do Part 4

16 Explosive or incendiary devices come in almost any shape and form. Past attacks have involved incendiary devices built into cigarette packets or tape cassettes, devices involving military grade high explosive in briefcases or sports bags or specially made for particular sites, and lorries packed with home-made explosive. There can be no exact descriptions of what to expect. But the details in this section will help managers to:

- focus on what damage each type of attack may do; and
- with the help of the remainder of this booklet, and the support of the Crime Prevention Department, plan for the consequences.

17 In Great Britain, businesses are most likely to face attack by:

- explosive or incendiary items which are delivered (the letter or package that comes by post or by hand);
- improvised incendiary devices;
- an improvised explosive device (“a home-made bomb”) in the building; or
- an improvised explosive device outside the building.

Delivered Items

18 The traditional postal bomb takes many forms – parcels, padded “jiffybags”, or envelopes of any shape or size. They may be delivered by hand or via a courier as well as “through the post”.

Postal bombs are generally designed to kill or maim the person who is opening them. Their effect is local. But a parcel bomb in particular may be large and designed to cause structural damage, in the same way as the bomb in the building.

The Bomb in the Building

19 Terrorists in particular have a long history of leaving hand-carried devices – hold-alls and so on – in public places or places to which access is simple. A device of this size can kill or maim anyone close to the seat of the blast, inflict injury on people and damage to stock in the immediate vicinity, and cause damage to glazing, cladding etc.

The Bomb outside the Building

20 The hand-carried bomb may also be a feature of terrorist attacks in the street or other public places like station concourses. More frequently in recent years, we have become accustomed to vehicle-borne devices, and particularly the lorry packed with home-made explosive. Such vehicles may contain 1 tonne or more of explosive:

- there will be major structural damage to buildings in a radius of up to about 50m;
- glass which is capable of killing or maiming will fall in a radius of 250m; and
- metal fragments from the device may still cause injury at 500m and beyond.



Part 5 Telephoned Bomb Threats

21 Terrorists sometimes telephone threats of bomb attacks; their calls appear to fall into two categories:

- 1 threats that actual devices have been planted; the aim is to save life (or to be able to blame inaction by others if there are casualties);
- 2 threats where no device has been planted, designed to disrupt.

22 The overwhelming number of telephoned bomb threat calls are made by malicious pranksters whose threats are empty. But making such calls is a crime, and they should always be reported to the police.

23 Occasionally the calls will actually be from terrorists. You will not be able to assess whether or not a call is “genuine”. The calls constitute a threat to the lives of your staff or your business or the lives of others in the community, and they must always be treated seriously and handled urgently.

24 Such calls may be the closest that you and your staff will come to terrorism. Because of the potential seriousness of each and every call, planning is needed, just as it is for other forms of attack.

25 The likelihood that you will be a recipient is increased if you are known or thought to operate a 24 hour switchboard service, and there is a belief that you will react quickly. Hotels and hospitals, organisations offering any sort of “emergency” service (including voluntary organisations), news agencies and any organisations involved with public transport may wish to give their switchboard operators special training in handling such calls.

26 But anyone may be a recipient of a bomb threat call. Handling them is not simple. It is difficult to remain calm and react effectively. Staff may be traumatized by the incident and will suffer more if they blame themselves for not reacting as well as they would have liked. The golden rules are:

- keep calm;
- try to obtain as much information as possible;
- dial 1471 (if that facility operates); and
- report it to the security co-ordinator and the police immediately.

All these things are difficult. To assist, a checklist is at Appendix 1. This should be on hand for use by all switchboard or reception staff.

27 The first line of defence against the common criminal may also prevent the terrorist from gaining access to premises. In terrorism, the priorities are to protect:

- the lives of staff and visitors;
- the contents of the building; and
- the fabric of the building.

Deter and Detect

28 Police Crime Prevention Departments will be able to provide all the necessary expert advice on physical security measures. Fire Departments and Planning Departments may also need to be consulted. What follows is therefore only a quick guide to the main considerations when seeking to deter or detect terrorism.

Doors

29 All external doors should meet the minimum requirements in respect of robustness and standard of locking systems. Those not in regular use should also have strong internal bolts. Glazed doors are only as secure as their glazing and this will need special attention.

Access Routes

30 The most effective access control is an efficient reception area. Access to side and rear entrances should be restricted to authorised persons only. Digital, swipecard or proximity locks all offer protection if security or reception staff cannot be present.

31 Visitors should be escorted, or wear temporary passes which might be colour-coded to show their validity and surrendered on leaving the building. Unauthorised visitors will be easier to detect if staff are asked to wear their passes at all times.

32 Searching of hand baggage and luggage has enormous deterrent value, and is well worth considering when the police have informed you that there is a particular risk. You have the right to refuse entry to any person who will not permit a search of their hand baggage.

You may also consider a body search but you have no power to carry out such a search unless the person agrees.

Windows

33 As a minimum, good quality key operated locks should be fitted to all ground floor windows and any windows to which access might be gained (eg from a flat roof).

Intruder Alarms

34 Many different forms exist and have to be selected for the circumstances of each site or installation.

CCTV

35 CCTV can make an important contribution to security in shops, outside buildings and in public places, as it is already doing across the country in the general context of community safety. The presence of cameras may also help to deter terrorists. If the system is of high quality and the product is recorded, CCTV provides a considerable aid to post-incident investigation which itself acts as a deterrent.

Lighting

36 Good lighting is a deterrent in its own right, and is essential for effective CCTV coverage.

37 In multi-occupancy buildings, shopping centres, high streets, business parks and the like, it is essential to make security – in the terrorist context just as in relation to any other crime – a joint communal effort. For example, common access control procedures can be agreed or CCTV cameras can be sited for maximum overall benefit. Effectiveness can be increased and costs greatly reduced.

38 It is possible to waste a lot of money on ineffective security systems. All good systems require the planning of an integrated security package that is focused on protecting your most valuable assets and your most vulnerable points. Remember, specific advice is available from the Crime Prevention Department – and it is free.



Good Housekeeping

39 Good housekeeping both inside and outside premises will reduce the opportunity for the planting of devices. Within buildings reduce the number of places where devices can be left:

- lock unoccupied offices and store cupboards;
- put simple plastic seals on maintenance hatches to which only occasional access is required;
- keep a place for everything and everything in its place;
- all communal areas – stairs, halls, toilets, rest rooms – should be kept clean and tidy;
- consider the removal of litter bins; but if you choose this option, take special care to increase cleaning effort so that rubbish is swiftly removed; and
- keep furniture in public areas to a minimum, and ensure that furniture and fittings are designed without spaces which give opportunities to hide a device.

40 Outside buildings, the same principles apply:

- keep everywhere as tidy as possible, including shrubbery and especially when it is close to entrances; and
- choose furniture and fittings that do not have spaces in which devices can be concealed.

Vigilance

41 Staff are certain to be one of your most valuable assets, and their protection is paramount. They are also one of the best sources of protection. They will usually know their own office, department, car park or whatever intimately. They should be encouraged to keep a sharp lookout for unusual behaviour or items out of place. Staff must be given confidence to report things and must know that their reports are taken seriously and recognised as a contribution to the business.

42 In a terrorist context they should particularly look out for anyone placing, rather than dropping, a packet or a bag in an unusual place, or in a fairly inaccessible spot like the back of a shelf in a shop.

Reducing the Consequences of Explosions

43 Planning for terrorist contingencies, and exercising search and evacuation plans are described in the following sections and are all part of reducing the damage that terrorists can do to your staff and business. As part of the physical security of your building, however, there are certain measures that you can take in respect of glazing that will considerably reduce death and injury to your staff and customers and bystanders.

Glazing Protection

44 Most casualties of terrorist attacks result from flying glass. There is extensive research data on blast effect on glass and tested solutions that will minimise the degree of shattering, the amount of injury and the costs of eventual building re-occupation. The solutions involve selecting combinations of types and thicknesses of glass to suit the circumstances, but a significant degree of protection can be obtained by using anti-shatter film, which holds fragments together, in combination with properly designed net curtains, which will contain flying glass in a “spinnaker” type effect. Detailed specifications are contained in Appendix 2.

Appointing a Security Co-ordinator

45 Successful response to an actual or potential terrorist attack depends on the creation of a company security policy and the appointment of a security co-ordinator to have full oversight of, and authority for, the totality of the terrorist security planning process.

46 The co-ordinator must have sufficient authority to direct the action to be taken in response to security threats. If he or she is not the Chief Security Officer, the person with the terrorist co-ordination responsibility must be involved in the planning and design of the building's exterior security, access control and so on, so that the terrorist dimension is taken into account. The co-ordinator must be consulted over any new building or renovation work, so that terrorist crime can be catered for in the design of the building, and the specification of glazing.

47 The co-ordinator should establish liaison with the Crime Prevention Department as a local and expert source of knowledge. During the development of plans, it is advisable to consult with all the emergency services. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, police officers have special powers at or within cordons. Plans, particularly regarding evacuation, must therefore be shared with the police who are responsible for ensuring the safety of the general public in the vicinity of your building.

48 The co-ordinator has seven main responsibilities:

- production of the risk assessment, and the consequent defensive measures and planning;
- devising and maintaining a search plan;
- devising and maintaining evacuation plans;
- deciding on the extent and direction of evacuation;
- deciding when to re-occupy;
- liaising with the police and other emergency services; and
- arranging staff training, communication cascades and drills, including training for his or her own deputies.

The co-ordinator's end product should be a plan or set of plans that have been checked with the police and practised, and are regularly audited to ensure that they are still current and workable.

Creating Security Plans

49 There are three crucial steps in drawing up counter-terrorist plans:

Step One

- Identify what sort of threats you are facing.

Step Two

- Identify what it is that you want to protect (people, property and data are the three common categories) and in what ways they are vulnerable to terrorist attack in particular.

Step Three

- Identify the most appropriate measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level (you will not be able to eliminate it altogether).

At the end of Step Three you will have a security plan. Before going on to that, remember these important factors about plans:

50 One person needs to have overall charge of planning, and he or she must have appropriate authority to get the co-operation of colleagues and if need be to recommend expenditure on protective measures.

51 Effective plans are simple, lucid and flexible – but flexibility does not mean that they can be open to interpretation when an incident is taking place, or can offer a range of options to follow, as this will simply confuse staff in the heat of an incident. Everyone must be clear what they are to do given a particular circumstance, as during an attack there is an inherent danger in trying to change plan.



52 Once they are made:

- plans must be followed; but
- they must be kept under review to reflect changes in buildings and personnel; and
- they should be checked regularly to make sure they remain accurate and workable – and there should be regular exercises.

Carrying Out Step One

53 This is the threat assessment checklist:

- What does the news tell us about the current national and international climate, or current terrorist campaigns?
- What can the local police tell you about the chance of a terrorist attack in your neighbourhood?
- Is there something about your building or your staff that would attract a terrorist attack: are you seen as having a special relationship with a high profile individual who is a terrorist target in his or her own right; has your company name been associated with animal experimentation?
- Does your location mean that you may suffer collateral damage from an attack on a high-risk neighbour?

Carrying Out Step Two

54 You know already what it is really important to you and your business. It may be something tangible and obvious: the data suite where all your transactions are recorded, or the one piece of equipment that keeps your whole plant running. It may also be less obvious – continued free access for the public, for example. You will have plans to safeguard some or all of these things from other threats already – for example, you will have defences against, and plans in anticipation of, fire, and defences against criminals who may want to steal your stock.

55 In the terrorist context you need to consider the research that may be carried out by the potential attacker to discover your main vulnerabilities or your prestige targets and to identify how each of these can best be protected.

Carrying Out Step Three

56 Step Three brings together the answers to Steps One and Two, and looks at what measures it is sensible to put in place to reduce the risk of damage.

Part 8 looks at five possible forms of attack and describes the sort of thing that the security plan should cover in each case.



Five Plans for Five Possibilities Part 8

Plan One: The Delivered Bomb

57 Most organisations receive huge amounts of mail, whether through the Post Office or other delivery and courier firms. This is an attractive route into your building or into your hands. It is a targeted attack. The aim is to kill or maim or disrupt, not to cause structural damage or mass casualties. The nature of your business and the current focus of terrorism or “activism” will give you, in consultation with the local police, a reasonable picture of how likely this form of attack is, and this will dictate just how far you want to go in your planning.

Preparing for the Possibility

58 Planning for the delivery of an explosive or incendiary device is based on two simple features:

- it will already have undergone some fairly rough handling, by the Post Office or by its courier.
- uncertainty over exact delivery times, and the weight and complexity of reliable timing devices, makes it very unlikely that the device will be triggered by a timer.

Handling delivered mail is therefore not generally dangerous in itself.

Recognising a Suspicious Item

59 The police Crime Prevention Department can give guidance on the features that may identify the typical letter or parcel bomb. And staff who handle mail can be helped to pick out potentially “suspicious” items by building good housekeeping measures into usual business routines:

- let staff know what is the usual pattern of deliveries and the types of item, and forewarn when unusual deliveries are expected; and
- encourage good practice in those you deal with regularly by having a clearly identifiable sender shown on each item.

Make sure that you have identified and briefed all staff who handle delivered items (think of Reception as well as the Mail Room).

60 If the risk and scale of the problem for you is sufficiently great you may want to invest in

commercially available X-ray or other equipment. The Crime Prevention Department can advise. This equipment is only as good as its operators and you will need a regular programme of training and checking to see that procedures are being followed.

Dealing with the Event

61 If you have detected a suspicious item:

- leave it alone (do not play with it to investigate it further, do not put it in a bucket of water or put something on top of it or throw it out of the window....);
- clear and secure the immediate area making sure the police will still have unhindered access to the suspicious item; and
- call the police.

Plan Two: Incendiary Devices

62 Incendiary devices are traditionally the weapon of choice against the retail sector, and occasionally against certain industries or public buildings. They may form part of a targeted attack (because of who the company is or what it sells) or the placing may be relatively random (if the aim is to damage a town centre or shopping mall itself). The purpose is to cause economic damage (directly and via publicity), not casualties.

Preparing for the Possibility

63 Planning against the possibility that an incendiary attack will be mounted against you is based on some basic assumptions:

- the device will be concealed for ignition when the premises are empty;
- as damage is the objective, having more than one potential seat of fire is attractive to the attackers;
- anything that triggers a sprinkler system will, because of the damage ensuing, be a good result even if total destruction is not achieved; and
- incendiary devices do not explode, they ignite.



Minimising the Risk of Successful Attack

64 Generally speaking the business need for continued mass public access will preclude any major screening programmes to search for devices being brought in, except at periods of the highest alert. The contingency plan should provide for:

- a search at the end of each day's business;
- a continued search after the discovery of one item; and
- plans for a discreet search during business hours in a time of high risk.

65 Devices will be carefully but not elaborately concealed, and the staff searching will not therefore need a high degree of knowledge to carry out rapid but thorough searching of easily accessible hiding places. All staff can maintain vigilance for those acting oddly in their areas.

Dealing with the Event

66 If an incendiary device has been discovered during search or by chance:

- do not touch it;
- clear and secure the immediate area; and
- call the police.

67 If there is a fire, and there is reason to suspect this is as a result of an incendiary device rather than a common accident, it may be acceptable to make an immediate, and brief, attempt to extinguish the fire if your existing fire arrangements and staff training provide for this. Even if staff have been trained, the possibility of multiple attack by incendiaries should be remembered, and staff and visitors evacuated according to pre-arranged fire plans.

Plan Three: The Bomb on the Premises

68 In practice it is unusual in the UK for a bomb containing high explosive (rather than an item delivered through the post or an incendiary) to be found inside a building, although it is not unknown. It is important to plan for this eventuality, not least because both terrorists and pranksters frequently claim that there is a bomb in the building. A bomb, with its explosive, timing and arming devices and its concealment, represents a considerable investment of planning, determination and skill. Left within a building, or in some other public space, it represents a very serious attempt at damage and disruption – and a disregard for the possibility of the loss of life. The threat call itself can cause economic disruption.

Preparing for the Possibility

69 Planning for a bomb attack inside your office, public areas, car park, storage unit or yard perimeter is based on certain assumptions:

- the bomber has to make his or her way inside your perimeter and leave the device in such a way to – at minimum – secure his or her getaway (suicide attacks have not been part of UK experience);
- an attack, whether with high explosive or home-made explosive, is always life threatening; and
- there will always be some structural damage, if only broken windows.



Minimising the Risk of Successful Attack

70 An office block or a factory with access control for staff and visitors (and their cars) offers relatively little opportunity for this sort of attack – providing the systems in place are properly applied. A public place, such as a shop or airport, is more at risk and at times of high alert search of baggage may be the only available means of protection – and deterrent. The risk of successful attack – and, equally importantly, the disruption caused by persistent threat calls – can be minimised by:

- search procedures by staff of their own areas; and
- search procedures for public areas.

71 Good housekeeping practice comes into its own against this sort of attack. Public and private areas should be kept as clear as possible, with rubbish regularly removed and boxes and equipment stored tidily and in their own recognised places. Regular users, as well as cleaning, maintenance and security staff, should all be encouraged to know what is usually where so that they can spot the unusual.

72 It is frequently said that any package that is out of place is a suspicious package – but you will not want to disrupt your business by making your staff anxious about every carelessly dumped bin bag. Their attitude to keeping their patch free of clutter will make them feel safer, deter a potential attacker – and make searching much simpler if a threat is made against you.

Dealing with the Event

73 The internal bomb attack is most often experienced as a terrorist hoax or a prank. However the potential damage, injury and loss of life could be severe. So the contingency plan in this case must cover both the handling of a threat call and the discovery of a suspicious item, and should involve:

- immediate notification to the police of any threat;
- pre-set plans for reacting to the threat call;
- pre-set, easily displayed and practised plans for evacuating to a place of safety (Part 9);

- pre-set and practised means of communicating evacuation plans to visitors; and
- means for securing the site against entry until the police have allowed access again.

Plan Four: Bombs outside the Building

74 The vehicle bomb represents an extreme form of terrorist attack, designed to cause maximum economic damage, both short and long term. The risk of large numbers of casualties and deaths is great because of the large scale structural damage that invariably results. Generally, in the UK, vehicle-borne bombs consist of home-made explosive in large quantity, involving a high degree of pre-planning, commitment and expertise. They are frequently accompanied by threat calls and once again it is important to be able to deal with the disruption caused by terrorist hoaxes or pranksters as well as with the incident itself.

75 There is also the chance that bombs will be left in streets, parks and other public places and in bags, briefcases and parcels. The potential for loss of life, injury and disruption is still high although the long term damage may not be so extensive.

Preparing for the Possibility

76 Plans for dealing with the chance of injury to your staff or damage to your property from a device outside your building have to be based on one key issue:

- Evacuation always carries a certain risk, either of staff moving closer to, rather than away from, the bomb (since warnings are rarely explicit) or of moving into the open where they may be at risk more from falling masonry and flying glass than the blast itself.

77 On this basis, occupiers of buildings should establish whether “internal evacuation” to a bomb shelter within the building is a viable option. In a bomb shelter area staff can be assured that whatever structural damage occurs to their building or those surrounding it, they will be safer until the emergency services can give them the all clear to leave. For further advice refer to Part 9, paragraph 91.



Dealing with the Event

78 Plans should cover the following:

- immediate notification to the police of any threat;
- pre-set plans for reacting to the threat call; and
- pre-set, easily displayed and practised plans for evacuating to a place of safety (which may be either a bomb shelter area or an external site) (Part 9).

Plan Five: Telephoned Bomb Threats

79 The phenomenon of telephoned bomb threats has become a commonplace, so much so that they merit a separate section earlier in this booklet.

Planning for the Possibility

80 Plans need to cover two possibilities:

- receipt of a call that refers to your own building; and
- receipt of a call about a bomb elsewhere.

81 All staff likely to answer your published numbers, in working hours or overnight, should be familiar with the Bomb Threat aide-mémoire and pro forma (Appendix 1), and have a supply ready to hand. They need to be fully familiar with any recording facilities or last number redial or display facilities that your switchboard provides. They must know how to contact both the security co-ordinator and the police.

82 A member of staff who has taken a call must be available to talk to the police.

Dealing with the Event

83 The pro forma will assist staff to handle the call itself and to record the necessary detail. If the call is threatening an attack elsewhere, your action will end once you have informed the police and handed over to them any necessary paperwork. But the threat may be to your premises, and will involve on your part:

- preliminary assessment of the threat (take it seriously.... or not?) If it is a giggling child, you may assume it is a hoax and adopt the “do nothing” approach. But if there is the slightest doubt you should consider
- initiating your evacuation (Part 9) or search (Part 10) plans, in whatever combination the timescale quoted by the caller and the location quoted by the caller suggests.

Remember, whatever you decide, always report any call to the police. **Click here to go to Plan Six:**



84 The purpose of evacuation is to move people from an area where they might be at risk to a place of lesser risk. The biggest dilemma facing anyone who has responsibility for an evacuation decision in the context of a terrorist threat is how to judge where might constitute a place of safety. If, for example, an evacuation route would take staff past a suspicious device outside your building, evacuation may be the riskiest course to take.

85 The decision to evacuate will normally be taken by the company, but the police will advise. In exceptional cases the police may insist on evacuation, but they will always need the help of the company's security co-ordinator; in other cases, such as the large vehicle bomb outside the premises and the possibility of secondary devices, they may insist that people do not leave the building.

86 Evacuation may need to take place in response to:

- a threat call directly to the building;
- a threat call received elsewhere and notified to you by the police;
- discovery of a suspicious package in the building (perhaps a letter bomb or incendiary, or a larger hold-all device);
- discovery by you of a suspicious item or vehicle outside your building; or
- discovery of an external device notified to you by the police.

Whatever the circumstances you must advise the police of what action you are taking.

The Evacuation Plan

87 In order to react sensibly, you must have evacuation plans ready. Depending on the circumstances of your building – its size, the number of exits, the amount of public access – your evacuation plan may involve:

- full evacuation outside the building; or

- evacuation of part of the building if the device is small and thought to be a one-off confined to one location (eg a letter bomb in a post room or a small incendiary type device); or
- evacuation of all staff apart from designated searchers; or
- full evacuation to an internal safe area – a Bomb Shelter Area.

88 If a time has been given for an explosion on the premises, you must allow sufficient time for the evacuation.

Essential Components of an Evacuation Plan

89 All plans must cover:

- designated routes and exits;
- a means of communicating effectively with staff, who may need directing away from one route if it is likely to take them into danger;
- designated staff to act as marshals during the evacuation, especially if there are likely to be large numbers of the public in the building, and/or as contact points once the assembly area is reached;
- an assembly area or areas at least 500m from the buildings (car parks should not be used), and an alternate area or areas. This distance will put staff beyond police cordons for most vehicle-borne devices. However, for absolute safety an alternative assembly area or areas at least 1km away may have to be considered; and
- training for staff with particular responsibilities, and practices for all staff.

All plans should be discussed in advance with the police, the emergency services, the local authority and neighbours.



Bomb Shelter Areas

90 As many of the injuries from bomb attack, especially large city centre lorry bombs, come from flying glass and other fragments, internal evacuation can be a good way of avoiding death or injury to staff.

91 Some buildings may offer suitable bomb shelter areas. These must always be selected with the advice of a qualified structural engineer; their size must be suitable; they must conform to fire regulations; and there must be a means of communicating with staff while within the shelter, even while there is a temporary loss of power, as may happen after a major explosion. Addresses for further sources of advice can be found at the end of this booklet, or contact your local Police Crime Prevention Department.

Re-occupancy

92 Re-occupancy must always be discussed with the police and as necessary the other emergency services. Safety remains paramount, and allowance must be made for secondary devices, vagueness of descriptions of location and misleading times. Structures may be unsound and damage to power and gas may make the environment unsafe. If an explosion has taken place, the building will be a crime scene.

93 Searches may be used as a part of routine good house-keeping, for example in shops, especially at close of business, when there is a general alert about incendiary or other types of attacks against the retail sector or some segments of it. Or a search may need to be carried out in response to a specific threat.

What to Look For

94 Bombs and incendiary devices are disguised in many ways. Searchers do not have to be expert in explosive devices. They are looking for anything:

- that should not be there;
- that cannot be accounted for; and
- that is out of place.

Who Should Search?

95 The main qualification for a searcher is familiarity with the place he or she is searching.

The police will not normally search premises following receipt of a bomb threat. They are not familiar with the premises and layout, and will not be aware of what should be there and what is out of place. They cannot therefore search as quickly and as thoroughly as staff who work there all the time.

Search Plans

96 Search plans should be prepared in advance and staff trained in them. The objective is to make sure that the whole building is checked as quickly and effectively as possible. If you do not search you will have no means of knowing when or whether your building is safe for re-occupancy, and if you do not have a plan your searching will be slow, costly and worrying for all those concerned.

Search Priorities

97 Those areas which will be used as bomb shelters or evacuation assembly areas, together with those areas where the greater number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable should be searched first. Public areas to which the terrorist may have had easy access should also have priority. Do not overlook car parks, the outside area and the perimeter.

Search Sectors

98 The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the building into sectors. If the business is organised into departments, sections and so on it will be convenient for these to be search sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for one or two searchers. Effective and systematic searching takes time.

99 Depending on room sizes, the sector may be one large room – such as a factory floor, shop, department or perhaps a number of small offices in an office suite. Cloakrooms, stairs, corridors and lifts must be included in the search plans. Do not forget to include car parks and other areas outside the building.

Initiating a Search

100 How is a search initiated? There are options:

- sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm;
- use of personal radios/pagers; or
- a telephone 'cascade' system: the Section Supervisor rings, say, three members, who in turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.



How to Search

101 The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough manner so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practice, to get a feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in a department store, office, cinema, warehouse, depot, supermarket or restaurant) and the length of time it will take.

What Happens when Something is Found?

102 The searcher who finds a suspicious item must not move it or interfere with it in any way. He or she will need a pre-planned method of communicating what has been found to the search co-ordinator. Action thereafter will depend on the nature of the device and the location. The golden rules are:

- do not touch it or move it;
- move away from the device immediately;
- communicate what has been found to the co-ordinator, using hand-held radios only once out of the immediate vicinity of the device; and
- the person finding the device must remain on hand to brief the police on the exact location and description.
- more detailed advice can be obtained from your local Police Crime Prevention Department.



Role of the Police Part 11

103 As will have been clear from the earlier sections, the Crime Prevention Department (either directly or through access to other police colleagues) of your local police force can assist with:

- assessing the threat, both generally and specifically;
- advice on physical security equipment and its particular application to the methods used by terrorists; they will be able to comment on its effectiveness as a deterrence, as protection and as an aid to investigation post-incident;
- advice on local installers of equipment; and
- devising plans and ensuring their conformity with other local arrangements, the requirements of the police service itself and those of the other emergency services.

104 For reasons of practicality the police cannot undertake search of your premises on your behalf, but they can offer advice on search plans.

It is essential that all the work you undertake on protective security is done in partnership with the police, and your neighbours, if your community is to be secure. As well as safeguarding your own business, the steps you take can make an important contribution to detecting terrorists.

105 Further guidance on the role of the police, the other emergency services and the local authority can be found in the companion booklet *Business As Usual*.



Part 12 Recovery Plans

106 Planning for recovery from disaster is increasingly being recognised as an essential component in the management of business. Businesses are used to planning against commercial risks – the sudden failure of a critical supplier; an unexpected bad debt; industrial action or the discovery of a serious fault in a product or process. Techniques of risk management have been developed to mitigate the consequences for the firm.

107 The companion booklet *Business As Usual* has been specifically written to help businesses prepare for recovery from the worst type of terrorist attack: the large vehicle-borne device in a city centre. It is designed to help any manager re-establish his or her business, focusing on the need to plan for the recovery of four essential components – people, premises, product and purchasers.



Useful Addresses Part 13

These organisations produce guidance notes relating to their fields of interest:

The British Council for Offices

Shinfield Grange
Cutbush Lane
Shinfield
Reading
Berkshire RG2 9AF
Tel: 0118 988 5505

The British Council of Shopping Centres

1 Queen Anne's Gate
London SW1H 9BT
Tel: 0171 222 1122

Health and Safety Executive

For information on the health and safety considerations relating to protective security measures. (For your local office, see under HSE in the telephone directory).

National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit

PO Box 849
London SW1P 1XD
Tel: 0171 931 7142

For advice on buildings, contact:

Glass and Glazing Federation

44–48 Borough High Street
London SE1 1XB
Tel: 0171 403 7177

Institution of Civil Engineers

Library and Information Services
1–7 Great George Street
London SW1P 3AA
Tel: 0171 222 7722

Institution of Structural Engineers

11 Upper Belgrave Street
London SW1X 8BH
Tel: 0171 235 4535

Laminated Glass Information Centre

299 Oxford Street
London W1R 1LA
Tel : 0171 499 1720

Appendix 1

Actions to be Taken on Receipt of a Bomb Threat

- SWITCH ON TAPE RECORDER (IF CONNECTED)
- TELL THE CALLER WHICH TOWN/DISTRICT YOU ARE ANSWERING FROM
- RECORD THE EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT

.....

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.....

- ASK THESE QUESTIONS

- 1 Where is the bomb right now?
- 2 When is it going to explode?
- 3 What does it look like?
- 4 What kind of bomb is it?
- 5 What will cause it to explode?
- 6 Did you place the bomb?
- 7 Why?
- 8 What is your name?
- 9 What is your address?
- 10 What is your telephone number?

- RECORD TIME CALL COMPLETED

.....

- WHERE AUTOMATIC NUMBER REVEAL EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE RECORD NUMBER SHOWN

.....

- INFORM THE CO-ORDINATOR

Name and telephone number of person informed

.....

- CONTACT THE POLICE BY USING THE EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBER

Time informed



THIS PART SHOULD BE COMPLETED ONCE THE CALLER HAS HUNG UP AND POLICE/BUILDING SECURITY OFFICER HAVE BEEN INFORMED

Time and date of call.....

Length of call.....

Number at which call is received (that is, your extension number)

ABOUT THE CALLER

Sex of caller? Male ☐ Female ☐ Nationality?..... Age.....

THREAT LANGUAGE

Well spoken ☐ Irrational ☐ Taped ☐ Foul ☐ Incoherent ☐ Message read by threatmaker ☐

CALLER'S VOICE

Calm ☐ Crying ☐ Clearing throat ☐ Angry ☐ Nasal ☐ Slurred ☐
Excited ☐ Stutter ☐ Disguised ☐ Slow ☐ Lisp ☐ Accent ☐ *
Rapid ☐ Deep ☐ Familiar ☐ Laughter ☐ Hoarse ☐

If the voice sounded familiar, whose did it sound like?

.....

* What accent

BACKGROUND SOUNDS

Street noises ☐ House noises ☐ Animal noises ☐ Crockery ☐ Motor ☐
Clear ☐ Voice ☐ Static ☐ PA system ☐ Booth ☐
Music ☐ Factory machinery ☐ Office machinery ☐

Other (specify)

REMARKS

.....
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.....
.....
.....
.....

Signature Date

Print name.....

This appendix may be freely photocopied

Appendix 2 Protection against Flying Glass

1 There are three main methods of protection against flying glass:

- 1 Applying transparent polyester anti-shatter film to the glass and providing bomb blast net curtains
- 2 Installing blast resistant glass i.e. laminated glass
- 3 Installing blast resistant secondary glazing inside exterior glazing.

2 The following details are designed to assist in the specification of protection and give pointers about installation.

Anti-shatter Film

3 Polyester film at least 175 microns thick should be used; 300 micron film should be considered for panes over 10 square metres or for ground floor windows over 3 square metres.

4 The specification can be lowered to at least 100 microns if bomb blast net curtains are also to be used.

5 The film must only be fixed under clean and dust-free conditions. On new windows or areas being re-glazed, it is preferable for the film to be applied to the glass to its extreme edges, before fixing the frames. But if extensive building work is continuing after installation, dust and debris may cause unacceptable scratching and it may be better to postpone fixing the film until after work is completed. The film should be applied as close as possible to the putty of glazing bars with an edge gap of less than 3mm. Five mm can be tolerated along particular irregular putty edges.

6 Butt joints are acceptable if film is insufficiently wide to cover the glass in one piece.

7 Film cannot be applied to the patterned side of frosted, figured or reeded glass.

8 On double glazing, if the window consists of two separate frames and in normal use the inner frame can be opened independently of the other, both panes should be treated. If the inner pane cannot be opened independently, or a "sealed unit" if fitted, applying film to the inner pane is sufficient. (Sometimes inner frames are only lightly fitted; if so, they should be fully secured).

Bomb Blast Net Curtains

9 Such curtains are only for use in combination with anti-shatter film. If the film is of sufficient thickness they may not be needed, but they are vital with single glazed windows in small panes in Georgian frames.

10 The curtains should be of 90 or 100 denier polyester terylene curtain material and be made twice the width and 1.5 times the length of the window. The bottom hem must incorporate flexible weights at the rate of 400 grammes per metre. The excess length should be folded concertina-wise and placed in shallow troughs at window sill level.

11 Curtains should normally be installed 50 to 100mm from the glass, but can be further back if other overriding conditions dictate.

Blast Resistant Glass: Toughened Glass

12 Toughened glass provides for safety but not security and is therefore not recommended for external window or door use.

13 Toughened (fully heat tempered) glass can resist high blast pressures without damage provided it is well supported in a strong and rigid frame. When it does break its fragments are less injurious than plain glass shards, but when used on its own toughened glass should have anti-shatter film applied.



Blast Resistant Glass: Laminated Glass

14 The minimum overall thickness of laminated glass to use is usually 7.5mm, including a minimum polyvinylbutryal (pvb) interlayer thickness of 1.5mm. It should be fixed in a frame designed to withstand a static force of 7kN/sqm over the complete area of the glazing and frame. Panes with an edge dimension of 1m or more should be provided with a frame rebate of at least 35mm giving a minimum bearing of 30mm.

15 If robust frames and deep rebates cannot be provided, a level of protection equivalent to anti-shatter film on plain glass with net curtains can be achieved using thinner laminated glass, eg 6.8mm thick.

16 In double glazing, the preferred standard is a 7.5mm laminated glass inner pane with a 6mm toughened glass outer pane in a robust frame with deep rebates. In less robust frames the laminated inner pane can be reduced to 6.8mm thick, but 7.5mm thick glass is still preferred.

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